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Abstract 
 
The issue of policing lies at the heart of the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1948–1954), in 
large part because the indiscriminate and heavy-handed tactics employed by the 
country’s national police force, the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was a leading 
factor driving support for the Huk movement. A key turning point in the campaign 
came with the reform and reorganization of the PC, as a result of which the bulk of 
the PC’s personnel were transferred into the Army, which was given the lead for the 
COIN campaign. Although the idea of a military-led COIN campaign, with the police 
in a supporting role, would appear to run counter to the assumptions that inspired 
this volume, the example of the Philippine Constabulary illustrates the damage that 
an ineffectual police agency can do in counterinsurgency and the lengths that a 
country may have to go to ameliorate the situation. 
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THE RESPONSE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT to the outbreak of 
the Hukbalahap, or Huk, Rebellion (1946–54) illustrates a classic pathology 
of weak counterinsurgent states: a fragile government attempted to forcibly 
suppress the outbreak of internal violence with a paramilitary police force—
the Philippine Constabulary (PC)—that lacked both the training and 
manpower for the task. In fact, the PC’s oppressive behaviour and 
institutional corruption significantly increased popular support for the 
insurgents. Only when the need to gain access to crucial American aid 
compelled it to reform and restructure both its security forces and its overall 
strategy did the Philippine government dramatically alter its failing 
approach. 
 
Not only does the experience of the PC highlight the problems that result 
from the politicization of police forces, it also raises questions about the 
utility of paramilitary-police style forces in counterinsurgency (COIN). Some 
analysts have suggested that ‘indigenous police are most effective in 
counterinsurgency efforts when structured along paramilitary lines’ (Mungie 
2010: 1). They argue that such forces, charged with carrying out both police 
and military functions, can make a valuable contribution to both COIN and 
peace operations because they execute missions that would otherwise have to 
be undertaken by regular military forces, harming the latter’s preparedness 
for conventional military roles  
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(Havron, Chenault, Dodson, and Rambo 1969: iv, 5). Other scholars suggest 
that even if the decision to ‘militarize’ the police is not a conscious one, police 
forces in COIN may evolve into paramilitary forces as their roles and 
responsibilities are pushed beyond traditional law enforcement (Schmidl 
1998: 38). 
 
What does the experience of the PC tell us about the efficacy of paramilitary 
police forces in COIN? In this instance, the confused paramilitary nature of 
the PC, combined with the limited ability of the Philippine government to 
professionalize the force, rendered it poorly prepared to carry out either 
police or military missions. The effectiveness of the PC in COIN was only 
realized once it was bifurcated into a dedicated policing agency and a regular 
military force. 
 
This chapter, which explores the role of the PC in the Huk Rebellion, begins 
with an overview of the Hukbalahap insurgents and an outline of the conflict. 
It then turns its attention to the Constabulary itself, with subsequent 
sections examining the deployment of the PC, the political constraints on its 
effectiveness, and efforts to enhance its performance in COIN. This is 
followed by a discussion of key supporting issues, including intelligence, 
resources, and rule of law institutions. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the lessons this case has for future COIN operations. 
 
The Hukbalahap Rebellion 
 
The Hukbalahap Rebellion, which lasted from 1946 to 1954, had its roots in 
the agrarian unrest that had long plagued central Luzon. The largest island 
in the Philippine archipelago, Luzon is larger than South Korea, and home to 
both the capital of the Philippines and its most fertile agricultural land. In 
1950, its population accounted for almost half of the country’s 20 million 
people (CIA Report 1950: 9). At that time, nearly three-quarters of Filipinos 
derived their livelihood, either directly or indirectly, from agriculture; but the 
country’s political economy was characterized by a ‘feudalistic agrarian 
system’ in which large landlords were the dominant political force (Letter, 
Abbey to Cowen 1951; CIA Report 1950: 3). Half of all farmers in Luzon were 
sharecroppers, working the estates of absentee landlords who claimed 50–70 
per cent of their harvest as rent and compensation for the use of seed, work 
animals, and farming implements (Office of Intelligence Research 1950: iii; 
Crozier 1960: 38). With agricultural incomes stagnant, by the early 1940s, 
the supermajority of tenant-farmers was deeply indebted to their landlords. 
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This highly stratified society was thrown into chaos by the Japanese invasion 
in December 1941 and the consequent establishment of a puppet government 
that employed many of the Philippine political and economic elite. The 
largest and most aggressive resistance group in the islands, the Hukbalahap 
(‘People’s Army against the Japanese’), consisted of tenant farmers from 
central Luzon and labour unions led by the Philippine Communist Party in a 
‘united front’. While fighting against the Japanese, the Huks (pronounced 
‘hooks’) also set out to redress rural grievances by redistributing abandoned 
estates. With 10,000 full-time guerrillas and another 100,000 part-time 
militia members, the Huks claimed credit for killing over 25,000 of ‘the 
enemy’—80 per cent of whom were collaborators and ‘obstructionists in the 
class war’—and denying the Japanese access to much of the valuable rice 
harvest in Luzon (Memorandum, Peralta to Roxas 1946; Lachica 1971: 115; 
Scaff 1955: 23). 
 
Following liberation, the Philippine government refused to recognize the 
Huks as legitimate anti-Japanese guerrillas—which meant they were denied 
compensation and benefits from the U.S. government—and replaced the 
officials the Huks had appointed to govern the towns and provinces under 
their control (Lansdale 1972: 8). As landlords began to reclaim the holdings 
in Luzon they had abandoned during the war, they employed ‘civil guards’— 
private militias up to 1,000 men strong—to forcibly collect back rent from 
tenants and eject squatters (Letter, Locket to Marshall 1948). These attempts 
to re-impose the pre-war social order by force were met with active 
resistance, as Huk fighters regrouped to defend themselves from the civil 
guards and defy returning landlords (Taruc 1953: 228–31). 
 
At first the Huks attempted to achieve reform through the political system, 
fielding a slate of candidates from a left-wing umbrella group called the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) in the 1946 Congressional elections. Six DA 
candidates won office; however, President Manuel Roxas—a minister in the 
pro-Japanese government who was widely believed to have been one of the 
‘guiltiest of the puppets’—refused to seat the men, alleging that they had won 
through ‘coercion, violence, threats and intimidation’ (Abaya 1946: 9; Owens 
1989: 194–5; Telegram 138 1949). For the Huks who fought against an 
occupation that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Filipinos, the world 
seemed upside down. The collaborationist ruling class and the wealthy 
landlords who backed them were returned to positions of authority—45 
members of the collaborationist government had been  
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elected to Congress—while those who actually fought the Japanese were 
regarded with suspicion. After a prominent peasant leader died in the 
custody of the Constabulary, the Huks, once again turned central Luzon into 
a battleground (Lachica 1971: 121). 
 
The political leadership of the Huk movement was made up of urban 
intellectuals from the Philippine Communist Party. With a rallying cry of 
‘land for the landless’, they declared an intention to form a government of ‘the 
proletariat, peasants, middle class, intellectuals, and progressive bourgeois’ 
which would redistribute large estates and nationalize industry, as well as 
eject the ‘American imperialists’ and their military bases (Kerkvliet 1977: 
224). However, analysts at the US embassy believed that the motivations of 
the Hukbalahap were ‘essentially socio-economic, not political’ 
(Memorandum, O’Neal 1948). Among the rank-and-file, as one former 
guerrilla noted, the prime reason for fighting was to stop ‘the civilian guards 
and PC from beating up my family’ and see that ‘the DA congressmen hold 
office’ (Kerkvliet 1977: 164). 
 
Organized into 100-man squadrons, Huk bands operated at will across 
central Luzon in formations as large as battalion-size (1,200). Exploiting 
surrounding swamps and mountains as base areas, they attacked civil guards 
and ambushed constabulary patrols, hijacked commercial trucking, and 
robbed provincial treasuries, compelling the government to disperse its 
limited forces to defend large areas of the countryside (Cable 1986: 50; 
Kerkvliet 1977: 205, Scaff 1955: 28; Telegram 311 1949). As one scholar 
assessed—‘in numbers, organization and small arms the Huk fighting units 
were comparable to the government forces. In terms of morale and civilian 
support in the areas of their operations, they had a decided advantage’ (Scaff 
1955: 28). 
 
The reach and power of the insurgents was shockingly illustrated in April 
1949 when several squadrons of Huks ambushed a motorcade containing the 
widow of Manuel Quezon, the country’s beloved wartime president-in-exile, 
her daughter and son-in-law, the head of the Army Intelligence, and the 
Mayor of the capital (Quezon City), killing them all (Telegram 1126 1949). 
Large swaths of Luzon, including 6,000 square miles of the richest rice 
growing region in the country, were soon being referred to as ‘Huklandia’ in 
recognition of the insurgents’ domination. Independent assessments found 
that ‘about half the people in dissident-infested areas are pro-Huk’, and 
information the insurgents received from a sympathetic public and agents 
within the Philippine government frustrated  
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the government’s efforts to hunt them down (Telegram 561 1949; Telegram 
458 1950; ‘AFP Brief for Melby Mission’ 1950; JUSMAG 1951). 
 
Following widespread fraud in the 1949 presidential election—perpetrated on 
behalf of the ruling Liberal Party by the PC—the insurgents’ ranks swelled, 
peaking at an estimated 15,000 guerrillas under arms at any one time 
(drawn from a pool of 30,000–50,000 part-time fighters), 100,000-strong 
clandestine political organization, and nearly two million active sympathizers 
(Bohannan 1962: 21; Kerkvliet 1977: 155; Taruc 1967: 60; Telegram 578 
1950; Telegram 458 1950). The frequency of Huk attacks increased tenfold, 
and soon they were conducting near daily raids on army posts and spreading 
their operations into outlying districts of Manila (Greenberg 1987: 65). By 
April 1950, an estimated 500,000 Filipinos had fled or been displaced by the 
fighting (Memo, Perez to Quirino 1950). The security situation in the country 
was so precarious that armoured cars were deployed near key government 
buildings in the capital, while the country’s president took to sleeping on his 
yacht lest he need to make a quick escape (Lansdale 1971; Telegram 2694 
1949). Fearful for their safety, those local government officials who had not 
been co-opted by the Huks refused to remain in central Luzon after nightfall 
and would return daily to the relative safety of Manila—thus further 
weakening the link between the government and the governed. 
 
However, following the rise of a new reform-minded Secretary of National 
Defence, Ramon Magsaysay, government security forces were reorganized in 
a manner that enhanced their COIN prowess and reduced the abuses of the 
civilian population which were driving support for the insurgency. In 1951, 
revitalized government forces were killing Huks at the rate of 40 to 50 a week 
(Lachica 1971: 131). By the start of 1952, the estimate of the number of 
guerrillas in the field had fallen from 15,000 to 8,000, and the U.S. embassy 
was reporting that the ‘dissident problem [had been] reduced from a military 
threat…to nuisance raids’ (Telegram 2318 1952). Increasingly cut off from 
the population and lacking both supplies and solid intelligence, the 
insurgents were soon spending more time and energy evading the 
government forces than planning offensives. Although it was not entirely safe 
to travel anywhere outside Manila after dark, by early 1953, the insurgency 
was believed to be in a state of ‘continued deterioration’ having been 
‘winnowed down to diehards’ (Telegram 1794 1952; Telegram 2200 1953). 
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Deployment of the Security Forces 
 
At the start of the insurgency, internal security in the Philippines was 
provided by the Philippine Constabulary, a 24,000-man paramilitary police 
force. As a national police force, the PC’s remit was to respond to large-scale 
disturbances such as riots and insurgency as well as maintain order in 
remote areas where local police forces were non-existent. Organized into 100-
man companies, the PC was deployed across each of the country’s 50 
provinces, with a Constabulary Provincial Commander overseeing one or 
more companies in each province. When large-scale operations required it, 
these companies could merge into battalion-size formations; however, to 
provide effective police coverage, companies were more frequently sub-
divided into detachments of 5–50 men scattered in penny-packets throughout 
a province, often in isolated or far-flung areas. In much of the archipelago, 
the PC was the most visible symbol of law and order. It was also the 
government institution with the most conspicuous presence and constant 
contact with the population, which meant that its actions had a 
disproportionate ability to shape popular perceptions of the government. 
 
As a result of its remit and deployment patterns, the PC was the first 
responder in cases of internal violence, such as the Huk Rebellion. Luzon had 
a long history of agrarian unrest and the government initially believed that 
Huk violence was merely small-scale banditry. From 1946–8, the Huks were 
largely dealt with as a routine law and order issue, with no concentrated 
attention given to the problem. The PC established check-points on major 
highways in Huk-affected areas, but this practice had no appreciable military 
utility since ‘out of inertia and lack of imagination’ the screening operations 
were conducted at fixed locations, and were thus easy for the Huk to avoid 
(Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 134). The Constabulary occasionally 
searched villages believed to be hiding insurgents; however, the majority of 
its time was spent on garrison duty. 
 
By 1948, the Huks had expanded the scope of their operations to the point 
where President Roxas declared them an illegal organization seeking to 
overthrow the government (Despatch 366 1948). Insisting that ‘the only way 
to fight force is to meet it with superior force’, he dispatched the PC to 
actively suppress the Huks in a ‘mailed fist’ campaign, with ‘extermination 
through military action…the basic aim’ (quoted in Manila Chronicle 1948; 
Scaff 1955: 28). These operations were, at best, inconclusive—the government 
did manage to kill, capture,  
 25 
or suppress roughly half the guerrilla fighters in the Huk army, but not only 
were those losses replaced, the insurgents expanded by a further 3,000 
fighters. The central government lacked interest in the conflict and failed to 
provide sufficient resources to undertake operations. With little to show for 
their operations, the security forces’ morale plummeted. Units adopted a 
defensive mentality and merely went through the motions of attempting to 
root out the insurgents. Some constabulary units purposefully patrolled areas 
known to have no insurgent presence to avoid combat, while government 
officials in Huk-dominated areas paid off the insurgents to avoid becoming 
the latest victim of their assassination campaign (Airpouch 814 1950). 
 
In mid-1950, the Philippine government reoriented its strategy, splitting the 
constabulary into dedicated police and military agencies, and giving the army 
the lead role in COIN. In conjunction with a series of reforms that 
reorganized and revitalized the Philippine armed forces, this new army-led 
approach put military pressure on the insurgents while actively seeking to 
ameliorate the major grievances driving support for their cause. 
 
Political Effects 
 
The PC was largely organized according to the continental model of policing, 
whereby the paramilitary force was the strong arm of the executive branch, 
highly centralized and focused on crime suppression in order to protect the 
state, rather than the citizenry. As a nation-wide force under the command of 
the executive branch, the constabulary was primed for politicization. Indeed, 
the head of the PC was appointed by the President—subject to confirmation 
by Congress—and served at the president’s pleasure with no defined term of 
office. 
 
The Constabulary Commander, Brigadier Alberto Ramos, was a 
collaborationist accused of having personally overseen the execution of 
American and Filipino guerillas on behalf of the Japanese. The US embassy 
in Manila reported that Ramos, who was also alleged to have previously been 
involved in illegal arms trafficking, ‘does not appear to be well qualified’ for 
his job (Airgram A-160 1949; Letter, Chapin to Gullion 1950). However, his 
personal loyalty to the President secured his position. Under Ramos, the 
constabulary was a tool of the ruling Liberal Party, used to falsify electoral 
registers, shutdown local newspapers, and  
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attack opposition candidates and their supporters. Administratively, the 
constabulary was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, which 
largely served to advance the interests of large landlords vis-à-vis 
agricultural workers. Indeed, the Minister of the Interior himself was 
described by the U.S. Embassy as a ‘reactionary member [of the] landed 
gentry’ (Telegram 1862 1948). 
 
At the sub-national level, provincial governors were charged with 
maintaining peace and order in the cities and towns they oversaw. Thus, 
constabulary companies and their commanders were subject to local political 
influence as well. Though theoretically independent of the provincial 
governor or local congressman, constabulary units often did the bidding of 
these politicians, including collecting intelligence on political opponents 
(Memorandum, Samaon Afdal to Chief of Constabulary 1949). Company 
commanders who did not cooperate with local politicians or were unwilling to 
overlook infractions of the law by the politically well-connected often found 
themselves transferred or relieved of duty. Detachments that were supposed 
to be protecting major population centres were frequently redeployed to 
guard the estates of politically influential landed interests, which left towns 
and villages vulnerable to infiltration by the insurgents. The politicization of 
the constabulary further eroded its professionalism as the leadership of the 
force was stocked with political loyalists rather than competent officers. 
Instead of accurately reporting the situation, these officers repeatedly told 
authorities in Manila that the Huks were being defeated in the field and that 
‘ultimate victory was in sight’ (Smith 1958: 145–6). 
 
Reform and restructuring of the constabulary—in particular moving it from 
the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of National Defence—depoliticized 
the force, which enhanced its COIN prowess, albeit at the cost of the Liberal 
Party’s control. Free and fair elections held in 1951 gave as important a boost 
to the prospects for peaceful democratic change as the fraudulent 1949 
elections had given the Huks. But those on the losing end of the reforms were 
not pleased with the change. After the Liberals suffered a significant defeat 
in the 1951 Congressional elections—largely due to their inability to use the 
constabulary to intimidate opposition candidates—several prominent party 
leaders, including the Speaker of the House, attempted to undo the reforms 
that had weakened their hold on power. In the run-up to the 1953 
presidential election, the Liberals attempted to remove the constabulary from 
the authority of the  
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steadfastly non-partisan Secretary of National Defence (Manila Chronicle 
1951; Telegram 2000 1951; Airpouch 339 1952). It required the direct 
intervention of the US—which threatened to immediately cut off military aid 
if the constabulary were transferred back to the control of the Ministry of the 
Interior—for the Liberals to retreat from their attempts to undo these critical 
reforms (Telegram 1953 1953). 
 
Enhancing Police Efficacy 
 
As a paramilitary police force, the PC was supposed to be trained to perform 
both military and policing duties; however, the force rarely excelled at either 
task. The Philippine economy had been shattered by World War II and the 
government did not invest sufficient funds to develop the PC into a high-
calibre force. The Constabulary School at Camp Crane in Rizal Province 
offered a 10-week Criminal Investigation Course, but limited training funds 
and the deteriorating internal security situation meant that very few 
personnel could actually attend (Department of the Army 1952: 5). Small-
unit training for military operations, based on US infantry tactics, was 
supposed to take place at the company level; however, this on-the-job training 
was frequently disrupted by the fragmented deployment of individual 
platoons and squads across a company’s area of responsibility. 
 
In 1949, the deteriorating security situation led the Philippine government to 
appeal for emergency American military aid. While the State Department 
believed that the Philippine government could not bring the Huks under 
control without significant financial assistance, the American ambassador in 
Manila, Myron Cowen, was concerned that unconditional grants would 
further encourage the Philippine government to use repression to solve its 
problems (Memo, Ely to Allison 1949). Since the actions of the PC were 
widely regarded as a key driver of support for the insurgency, augmenting its 
capacity without also altering its behaviour could be extremely 
counterproductive (Airpouch 307 1950). 
 
Recognizing that abuse by the security forces was driving support for the 
Huks, in mid-1950, the commander of the Joint US Military Assistance 
Group (JUSMAG) warned Roxas’ successor, President Elpidio Quirino, that 
the ‘Constabulary, combined with the vicious system of Civil Guards, has 
gotten seriously out of hand during the past year’ (Letter, Anderson to 
Quirino 1950). JUSMAG’s solution  
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was to shift responsibility for the COIN campaign to the non-partisan and 
more professional 13,000-man army, which would then be quickly expanded 
by consolidating the constabulary under the command of the Ministry of 
National Defence. Not only would this move enhance the coordination of 
COIN operations by bringing all of the security forces under a single 
command, it would also allow US military aid, which could not be used for 
police forces, to benefit the constabulary. Although the Philippine Secretaries 
of the Interior and National Defence expressed their opposition to such a 
move on the grounds that blurring the lines between policing and war-
fighting ‘would be dangerous’, JUSMAG observers believed that they really 
objected to the fact that integration into the military chain of command 
would put the constabulary beyond the influence of local politicians who 
frequently used it for their own ends (Memorandum, Baluyut to Quirino 
1949; JUSMAG 1949: 4 November, 8 December). This was, of course, 
precisely what the JUSMAG intended. 
 
The Embassy and the JUSMAG made it clear that American military 
assistance was conditioned on the integration of the PC into the army 
(Abueva 1971: 146). In the face of this pressure, Quirino tried to secure the 
aid by bluffing his patrons. He agreed to cap the constabulary at 12,000 men, 
with the rest of the force integrated into the army; but he avoided 
implementing the measure for six months (JUSMAG 1949: 22 December). 
During this time, he tried to place pressure on the United States by openly 
criticizing the Truman administration’s failure to assist the Philippines 
(Telegram 674 1950: 1418; Abueva 1971: 147). The United States stuck to its 
guns, however, and held back additional military aid until the PC was 
restructured. 
 
In late March 1950, on the anniversary of their founding, the Huks launched 
large-scale coordinated attacks across Luzon which put Philippine forces on 
the defensive. Despite the increased insurgent threat, US military assistance 
remained contingent on the reorganization of the constabulary and the 
implementation of concrete reforms to reduce abusive treatment of the 
civilian population. President Quirino, who was under considerable pressure, 
finally relented, signing an order that reduced the PC to 7,000 men, 
transferred 17,000 PC personnel to the army, and placed the PC under the 
operational control of the Department of National Defence (Telegram 211 
1950; Telegram 220 1950; JUSMAG 1950). The Philippine Armed Forces now 
consisted of four branches—the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the PC. 
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This reorganization was closely followed by the emergence of energetic and 
reform-minded leadership at the Department of National Defence. After a 
major Huk offensive saw the insurgents attack a dozen towns across Luzon, 
temporarily capture two provincial capitals, and overrun a constabulary 
base—where they massacred the nurses, patients, and doctors in the facility’s 
hospital before burning it down—frustration boiled over in the Philippine 
government. When the Secretary of National Defence resigned, the US 
embassy pushed for the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay, a Liberal Party 
congressman and Chairman of the House National Defence Committee, as 
Secretary of Defence. During the Japanese occupation, Magsaysay had fought 
with a pro-American guerrilla unit and shared the views of many in the U.S. 
Embassy and JUSMAG regarding the need for reorganization of the 
Philippine armed forces (Abueva 1971: 147–8). 
 
Once in office, Magsaysay proved to be a tireless and capable leader who set 
out to transform the armed forces. He sought to reenergize the military, 
raising their morale while simultaneously building public confidence in the 
force. Magsaysay worked to eliminate a major cause of support for the 
insurgents by curtailing the armed forces’ mistreatment of the civilian 
population. He empowered vigorous young field commanders to operate in the 
Huks’ ‘liberated zones’, denying them access to food and supplies. He also 
depoliticized the military by cashiering cronies and reducing corruption, 
while simultaneously augmenting training for regular soldiers to increase 
their capacity and professionalism (Hart 1953: 67). Higher pay and greater 
logistical support for units in the field improved discipline and eliminated the 
need for soldiers to steal from the population or scavenge supplies when on 
patrol (Letter, Jones to Quirino 1948; Greenberg 1987: 85; Valeriano and 
Bohannan 1962: 2081). American military and economic aid facilitated 
Magsaysay’s efforts, allowing him to raise the salaries of Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) personnel and undertake civic action projects in rural 
areas. 
 
Following the force’s consolidation and incorporation into the Department of 
National Defence (DND), the remaining elements of the PC were reorganized 
for the enforcement of law and order (Department of the Army 1952: 2). 
Although the company remained the PC’s basic unit, the size of these 
formations was shrunk by a third. With the army taking the lead in COIN, 
the primary contribution of the re-structured constabulary was to prevent 
organized lawlessness in rural areas, which  
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might otherwise divert army resources from anti-Huk operations. The 
constabulary primarily facilitated COIN operations by providing units with 
intelligence on specific people and developments in their area of 
responsibility and in some instances eliciting public support for army 
operations. However, in the case of a Huk raid on a population centre, PC 
units would attempt to engage the insurgents until the army could arrive. 
 
The problem of training continued to plague the PC. With the army taking 
the lead against the Huks, it took priority when it came to limited training 
funds. Between January 1950 and June 1952, just 270 officers and 450 men 
(10 per cent of the force) completed the training course at the Constabulary 
School (Department of the Army: 6). Moreover, the continual demands of 
police operations undercut the opportunities for unit training. The Philippine 
government drew up plans ‘for bringing all Constabulary companies from the 
field for eight weeks of training in basic and technical subjects…’ but the 
requirements of on-going policing meant that throughput averaged only 12 
per cent of the force per year (Department of the Army: 6). 
 
With the constabulary free from the politicized influence of the Ministry of 
Interior, Magsaysay was able to court martial ‘weak, inefficient and corrupt 
officers and enlisted personnel’, resulting in the cashiering of over 400 unfit 
officers in the subsequent three years, including the Constabulary 
Commander Brigadier Ramos (Department of the Army: 5; Hart 1953: 67; 
Lansdale 1972: 43). Since the constabulary and the army were both under the 
DND, movement of personnel between the two organizations was quite 
frequent. Unfortunately for the PC, the government’s policy of reassigning 
energetic and capable constabulary officers to the army meant that the 
organization continued to suffer from a shortage of competent leadership. 
Nevertheless, under the DND’s strict oversight, the constabulary was free of 
the political influence that had previously tainted its operations. In 
combination with an aggressive effort to dismiss incompetent and corrupt 
personnel, the PC began to shed its abominable reputation (Department of 
the Army: 5). 
 
Meanwhile, the elements of the constabulary merged into the army were 
organized into 1200-man Battalion Combat Teams (BCT)—reinforced 
infantry battalions complete with reconnaissance assets. It was envisioned 
that the BCTs, as mobile, combined-arms forces, would be capable of 
independent operations in the rough terrain of Luzon while having more 
mobility and flexibility than the PC companies they  
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replaced. Moreover, these larger-sized formations would better deter Huk 
ambushes. In early 1950, the Philippine army had just two combat-ready 
infantry battalions, but by the end of the year it had 10 operational BCTs, 
many of them formed from former constabulary companies. To professionalize 
the force, army officers were assigned to command former PC companies, who 
received modern weapons and advanced unit training. 
 
Police Performance in the Fight 
 
In the early years of the Huk Rebellion, poorly paid and trained enlisted 
members of the constabulary contributed to the government’s problems 
through the ‘irregularities of [their] conduct—one time too vicious in their 
conduct, another time, so lax as to intermarry with Huk women’ (Telegram 
1152 1950). Low—and frequently delayed—pay meant that the PC had to loot 
supplies from the local peasantry. Road checkpoints, supposedly established 
to reduce the insurgents’ freedom of movement, became opportunities for the 
members of the PC to collect ‘tolls’ to supplement their wages (Valeriano and 
Bohannan 1962: 79). The US embassy estimated that there was a ‘fineness of 
demarcation’ between the Huks and the constabulary. ‘All have guns…and 
all are completely irresponsible’ (Telegram 1152 1950). At the same time, 
constabulary officers were accused of enriching themselves by levying illegal 
taxes on plantations and forcing farmers to thresh their rice in constabulary-
run mills (Melby Mission 1950). Not only did these practices create 
widespread corruption among the PC, they harmed the government’s 
relations with the local population. 
 
With the majority of constabulary elements tied down in static protection 
duties, the PC rarely took offensive action against the Huks unless compelled 
to do so by high-level political pressure or ‘scathing newspaper comments’ 
(Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 94). In offensive operations, employing the 
conventional tactics of positional war, the constabulary repeatedly attempted 
to encircle the highly mobile Huks and bring them to battle, which proved to 
be as ineffective as it was destructive (Telegram 1011 1950; Telegram 492 
1949). In the absence of a clear campaign plan or centralized command 
mechanisms, PC companies conducted operations as the local commander 
saw fit. Without effective intelligence, the PC relied on indiscriminate 
measures to separate the guerrillas from the population—large scale cordon-
and-search operations,  
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food denials, and collective punishment. The latter included the slaughter of 
livestock, the destruction of crops in the field, the demolition of dwellings, 
mass arrests, and summary execution of hundreds of peasants (Moore 1971: 
11). It is not without justification that some scholars judged that the PC 
conducted itself ‘like an army of occupation’ (Greenberg 1987: 70; Lachica 
1971: 121). 
 
As Huk political leader Jesus Lava readily admitted—’The great majority of 
Huks joined because of repression by the Philippine Government…and 
civilian guards. Many felt it was either join or be killed without at least 
putting up a fight’. The US embassy concurred, noting it was ‘reasonable to 
assume that some of the Huks are merely trying to avenge mistreatment at 
the hands of the PC’ (Telegram 1152 1950). Embassy personnel advised 
Washington that—’so long as the constabulary seize foodstuffs without 
paying for them, become drunk and disorderly, extract information by 
inhumane methods, abuse women, shoot up country towns and generally 
mistreat the populace, just so long they will continue to lose the Philippines 
to the [Huks]’ (Despatch 432 1950: 1436). 
 
Following the reorganization of the security forces and the designation of the 
army as the lead COIN force, the situation changed markedly. Central Luzon 
was blanketed with battalion combat teams, many in areas that had formerly 
been Huk ‘safe zones’ (Kerkvliet 1977: 208). Each BCT was assigned a 
specific zone of operations—typically half or a third of a province. Initial 
deployments tied down the majority of the BCTs in static defensive positions 
as they focused on protecting the population against Huk raids and 
generating the local intelligence necessary for offensive operations against 
the insurgents. Army BCTs began by establishing a presence in the major 
barrios in their area of responsibility, where they disrupted the link between 
the active guerrillas and their supporters by establishing roadblocks and 
enforcing curfews. 
 
The conspicuous large-scale sweep operations were replaced by small 
formations which penetrated deeply into Huklandia in search of the 
insurgents’ base areas (Kerkvliet 1977: 241). Not only had it been relatively 
easy for the highly mobile insurgents to avoid the large-scale operations, it 
was frequently during sweep operations that the security forces, unable to 
corner their elusive prey, vented their frustrations on the civilian population. 
Previously, the Filipino security forces had only conducted desultory patrols 
along major roads adjacent to their cantonments. Under Magsaysay, the 
security forces focused on off-road  
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patrolling by squadron or platoon sized units, conducted on an irregular basis 
and often lasting several days at a time. 
 
To demonstrate that the government could be a force for good, the 
constabulary and other elements of the armed forces undertook ‘civic 
action’—digging wells in remote areas, repairing roads and bridges, providing 
basic medical treatment to rural peasants, and building schools. With 
American aid, 300 miles of new roads were laid and over 2,000 wells were 
dug across the island over the subsequent four years (Greenberg 1987: 139). 
Government lawyers were ordered to assist citizens in pursuing legal action 
against abusive military personnel and represent tenant farmers in their 
legal disputes with landlords for free (Telegram 1194 1951: 1510–11; 
Lansdale 1972: 48). To ensure that the security forces were accountable, the 
Defence Secretary established a nickel telegram service that would allow any 
Filipino to send a message reporting any abuse or problems directly to his 
office. 
 
Having fought as a guerrilla against the Japanese, Magsaysay knew how 
hard the life of an insurgent can be. To provide rank-and-file Huks a way to 
give up their struggle, he established an amnesty that allowed those who 
were not guilty of a major crime to reintegrate into society. Surrendered 
guerrillas were given the tantalizing option of joining the Economic 
Development Corps (EDCOR), which used American aid to create 
reintegration settlements on other less populated islands (Romulo and Gray 
1957: 167, 221). EDCOR offered the opportunity to establish a 20-acre 
homestead on the island of Mindanao, with the government helping him to 
clear land, build a home, and purchase supplies. Retired soldiers and their 
families lived alongside selected former insurgents and kept watch over their 
formerly wayward fellow citizens. If the Huk worked his plot of land for 
several years, he was granted the title in perpetuity. 
 
Only 950 families were ever resettled by EDCOR—less than 250 of whom 
were those of former guerrillas (Kerkvliet 1977: 239). However, the effort 
directly responded to the Huks’ slogan of ‘land for the landless’. News that 
the government was providing land to surrendered insurgents triggered a 
wave of defections. Why fight for a farm and a future when the government 
was giving it away? The Philippine government estimated 1,500 active 
guerillas surrendered to try to join the EDCOR programme, which would 
have otherwise tied up several thousand additional government troops had 
they remained in the field. 
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By early 1951, Ambassador Cowen was reporting back to Washington that 
the reforms were ‘injecting new enthusiasm in [the] armed forces which may 
be [the] dominant factor in improving effectiveness’ (Telegram 2157 1951). 
This view was corroborated by Huk leader Jesus Lava, who said that ‘when 
Magsaysay started making reforms in the Philippine army and in the 
government generally it had an impact not only on the movement’s mass 
support but on the [guerrillas] as well’ (Kerkvliet 1977: 238). In the second 
half of 1951, the new leadership of the AFP and the reforms instituted by 
Magsaysay began to have an impact as the new BCTs successfully undertook 
offensive operations against the insurgents. With morale on the rise, the 
armed forces were displaying increasing levels of competence. The 
reorganized BCTs slowed the Huks’ progress and began to place the 
insurgents on the defensive, forcing them to abandon Luzon’s fertile 
agricultural plains for the sanctuary of the island’s mountains and swamps. 
 
Intelligence 
 
In the early years of the conflict, the PC’s predatory treatment of the civilian 
population hindered its ability to cultivate intelligence from the populace. 
Moreover, according to JUSMAG assessments, the Philippine government’s 
capacity to develop raw information into actionable intelligence and 
disseminate it in a timely manner was ‘extremely poor’ (JUSMAG Brief for 
Melby Mission 1950). Until the end of 1951, the government’s intelligence 
efforts had been fragmented, with the PC, the Military Intelligence Service 
(MIS), the National Bureau of Investigation, the Manila Police Department, 
and a host of other agencies all independently collecting intelligence on the 
Huks (Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 138). Although these agencies did a 
reasonable job of pushing intelligence up to the country’s national leadership, 
there was little downward transmission of actionable information to units in 
the field, nor was intelligence sharing across agencies a common practice. 
One JUSMAG officer described the redundancy of effort across agencies as 
‘phenomenal’ while noting that bureaucratic jealousy ‘was rampant’—a 
situation that ‘would have frightened any organization-minded intelligence 
officer’ (Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 138). 
 
The U.S. brought six experienced combat intelligence officers, with prior 
knowledge of the Philippines, onto the JUSMAG staff to assist the  
 35 
PC and army in developing techniques for cultivating information from 
friendly civilians and captured insurgents (Memorandum, Hobbs to Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 1950). JUSMAG also outlined a plan to reorganize intelligence 
collection for COIN. Implemented in January 1951, this made the MIS the 
lead agency for COIN intelligence. Intelligence teams were assigned to all the 
BCTs, decentralizing intelligence collection and dissemination by making the 
local area commander—rather than a separate intelligence agency or 
organization—responsible for the intelligence effort in his area of operations 
(JUSMAG Semi-Annual Report 1951). 
 
To develop a professional intelligence corps, an intelligence school was 
established which trained 240 officers and 570 enlisted men in the first 18 
months of operation (JUSMAG Semi-Annual Report 1952). For the first 
several years of the conflict, there was no systematic programme for the 
interrogation of Huk prisoners—captured insurgents were simply locked 
away and occasionally beaten for information. Under Magsaysay, the 
maltreatment of prisoners ended, which made them more likely to cooperate 
and their comrades in the field more likely to surrender. With American 
guidance, the constabulary built a network of informants and assembled 
dossiers on known Huks. They also began interrogating the families and 
friends of insurgents, encouraging them to plead with their loved ones to give 
up their armed struggle (JUSMAG Semi-Annual Report 1951). 
 
To generate intelligence on the guerrillas while simultaneously 
delegitimizing them, the government offered extraordinarily large cash 
bounties for information leading to the capture of Huk leaders. The basic 
reward began at a rate of 5,000 pesos—10 times the average annual 
agricultural wage—and went as high as 100,000 for senior Huk commanders 
(Shalom 1977: 160). Wanted individuals were always portrayed as criminals, 
with corresponding details provided about the specific robbery, arson, or 
murder of which they were accused. Publicizing the crimes reduced the 
insurgents’ heroic image while creating divisions between the people and the 
Huks, as well as between the rank-and-file insurgents and their leadership, 
who began to worry about the temptations for betrayal such rewards created. 
 
In the early years of the conflict, the security forces had been hamstrung by 
their lack of reliable information about the insurgents and their organization. 
This began to change as the combination of better  
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treatment of the civilian population and rewards for cooperation paid off in 
the form of information. Rural inhabitants of Luzon heaped praise on 
Magsaysay, saying that he ‘cleaned up the PC and Philippine army’ and ‘got 
rid of the civilian guards’. As one provincial Huk commander noted—’All the 
reforms that were promised and partially implemented, even though small 
and show-case in nature, were encouraging for people. Many people believed 
in the government…’ (Quoted in Kerkvilet: 238). Impressed with Magsaysay’s 
sincerity, the Huk commander for greater Manila, Taciano Rizal, approached 
the Secretary of National Defence with the intention of defecting to the 
government’s side. Rizal provided the government with the location of the 
insurgents’ safe houses in the capital. The simultaneous raid on 22 locations 
across the city resulted in the arrest of over 100 people, including a large 
percentage of the politburo as well as ‘two truckloads’ of the central 
leaderships’ papers (Abueva 1971: 167). 
 
Although the capture of so many senior leaders was a blow for the Huks, the 
insurgents managed to carry on the fight for several more years. In the 
months following the capture, they launched daily attacks while expanding 
their operations into new areas—leading JUSMAG observers to conclude that 
‘they were not weakened by the capture of the Manila members of their 
Politburo’ (Lansdale 1972: 85–6). Indeed, the Huks themselves judged that 
the capture of the politburo only resulted in a ‘slight lowering of the morale of 
the ordinary rank-and-file member of the party’, while their leadership 
actually debated expanding the scope of their military operations (‘Top Secret 
Report on Communist Military Committee Conference’ 1950). 
 
Resources 
 
Over the course of the conflict, the weapons and equipment of both the PC 
and the Philippine army were adjusted to render the forces better suited to 
conduct discrete COIN operations among a civilian population in a manner 
that minimized collateral damage. At the same time, a significant effort was 
undertaken to provide field forces with sufficient provisions to reduce their 
need to prey on the local civilian population for supplies. 
 
Befitting their paramilitary role, the PC was initially equipped as a light 
infantry force. Personal weapons consisted of .30 calibre M1 rifles and 
carbines, supplemented by Browning automatic rifles and .45 calibre  
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submachine guns. Fire support came in the form of light and heavy .30 and 
.50 calibre machine guns, 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, and occasionally, 
batteries of 105 mm howitzers. Armoured cars and light tanks were employed 
to maintain security on highways and other major roadways. Following the 
restructuring of the armed forces, the new constabulary units were stripped 
of their heavy weapons and armed primarily with .30 calibre rifles and billy 
clubs—weapons that are more appropriate for police work (Department of the 
Army 1952: 2). 
 
The constabulary elements that were formed into BCTs also had their 
armaments altered. Between 1946 and 1950, the PC made frequent use of 
artillery to shell suspected Huk positions; however, they were rarely 
successful in bringing major firepower to bear on insurgent bands. Far more 
often, the local civilian population bore the brunt of this approach, and the 
resulting casualties not only alienated the populace but also drew the scorn of 
the insurgents. To facilitate small-unit operations, increase mobility, and 
reduce collateral damage from COIN operations, the battalion’s artillery and 
heavy mortar sections were replaced with additional rifle companies. Heavy 
weapons were deployed only in specific scenarios, on an as-needed basis 
(Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 133). 
 
For several years, JUSMAG had advised the Philippine government that the 
‘niggardly attitude’ towards the ‘pay, clothing and substance allowance’ of 
enlisted men was a major barrier to enhancing the effectiveness of the 
constabulary and army (Letter, Jones to Quirino 1948). Magsaysay gave 
emergency status to the procurement and distribution of field rations in order 
to ensure that government forces were capable of sustaining themselves in 
the field. This meant that they no longer needed to steal from the population 
or scavenge supplies when on deployment, leading to a significant 
improvement in relations with the local peasantry (Valeriano and Bohannan 
1962: 208). (In the past, when deployed to the provinces, the underpaid and 
poorly disciplined members of the constabulary would billet themselves in 
private homes, appropriate foodstuffs, and force local women to do their 
cooking and washing (Thorpe 1962: 98).) Magsaysay also used American aid 
to raise the salary of the armed forces, which further reduced their incentive 
to rob or extort the population. In 1950, a Filipino soldier did not earn enough 
even to pay for his daily meals, but Magsaysay tripled wages, both raising 
their morale and reducing corruption (Greenberg 1987: 85). 
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Rule of Law 
 
The Philippine legal system was designed to protect citizens from capricious 
and unfair treatment at the hands of the authorities, which posed difficulties 
for responding to a large-scale insurgency. Since a captured insurgent was 
entitled to the same due process protections as any other Philippine citizen, a 
guerrilla was automatically released if they were not presented before a judge 
within six hours of their arrest and a prima facie case presented against 
them within 24 hours. Consequently, the constabulary ‘found it almost 
impossible to hold a dissident captive, since the time-space element from the 
field to the court offices…is frequently greater than six hours’ (JUSMAG 
Semi-Annual Appraisal 1951). Moreover, if the charge filed against the 
insurgent was anything short of murder, he had a right to demand to be 
released on bail. As a result, one JUSMAG officer noted—‘it was literally true 
that a Huk, captured in a fire fight could be free and back with his unit 
within seventy-two hours or less’ (Valeriano and Bohannan 1962: 54). 
 
Although they recognized this as a significant problem, politicians from the 
ruling Liberal Party were unwilling to propose as drastic a step as 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, aware that such a move would be 
deeply unpopular after the brutality of Japanese occupation. More 
importantly, with a vocal and active press ready to condemn any curtailment 
of civil liberties and a political opposition looking for any opportunity to 
attack the government, Liberal Party leaders worried that such an action 
would devastate their party’s electoral chances. The political environment 
changed following the raid on the politburo in Manila, during which the 
Philippine government discovered that the insurgents were ‘a better 
organized [and] more potent force than had been imagined’ (Lansdale 1972: 
63–4). The public revelation of the size and scope of the Huk organization 
provided the government with the political cover it needed to temporarily 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in conflict zones. This move, in turn, 
enhanced the ability of the government to collect intelligence on the Huks 
(The Constabulary Story 1982: 302). 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
Although each insurgency is unique, the experience of the PC suggests 
several lessons relevant to the deployment of police forces in other 
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insurgencies. The first regards the utility of paramilitary police forces in 
COIN. Bringing the police under the control of the military seems to run 
counter to the received wisdom of how to employ such forces in COIN, 
however, the corruption and brutality of the PC made such actions necessary 
to reform the institution. While some have suggested that paramilitary police 
forces are well suited for COIN, the experience of the PC in the Huk 
Rebellion raises doubts. The dual police and military missions were never 
satisfactorily delineated and the force lacked the training and resources to 
excel at either mission, let alone both. Although the resources of the 
Philippine government were particularly scarce in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II, it did not differ markedly from other countries facing an 
active insurgency; they often suffer from ‘declining public order, rising 
domestic violence, stagnating economies, and infrastructure deteriorating 
because of the lack of basic maintenance’ (Olson 1993: 11). 
 
Detecting and severing the links between insurgent groups and the civilian 
supporters they rely on for shelter, transport, and information requires solid 
investigatory police work. The paramilitary nature of the PC, combined with 
the limited resources of the Philippine government, prevented that capability 
from being widely developed among the PC. Furthermore, traditional police 
forces are believed to be helpful in COIN because they have experience in 
regularly dealing with civilians as well as achieving their missions using the 
minimum amount of necessary force, unlike the regular military. That makes 
them less likely to alienate the public when carrying out internal security 
duties. In sharp contrast, the paramilitary PC, which did not possess either 
connections in local society or deep experience in civil policing, responded to 
the civilian population in Luzon with maximal force. The poor relations that 
PC units developed with the population in their areas of responsibility 
hindered the cultivation of the sort of human intelligence networks that 
police forces can normally provide as a result of their regular interaction with 
the civilian population. The Philippine government’s COIN prospects only 
improved after the PC’s responsibilities for policing and military operations 
were distributed to separate organizations. 
 
Second, the constabulary experience highlights the critical importance of 
ensuring adequate pay and logistical support for police forces. As one of the 
primary points of contact between a government and its population, the 
police have ample opportunity for corruption. As a result of this  
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regular contact, they play a significant role in shaping perceptions of the 
government, which means major failings in the force can undermine public 
confidence in the government as a whole. Ensuring sufficient pay and support 
such that the police do not need to scavenge supplies or extort money from 
the civilian population must be a priority, as is the establishment of 
administrative procedures to swiftly dismiss corrupt officers when they are 
discovered. For a resource-constrained government facing an insurgency, 
raising police pay may seem like a luxury. However, ultimately it is cheaper 
to pay to establish a police force made up of high-quality professional officers 
than it is to undo the damaged inflicted by a repressive and dishonest police 
force that drives civilians into the arms of the insurgents. 
 
Finally, this episode also suggests that the steps necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of the police force (or of COIN operations, more generally) may 
run directly counter to the interests of the local government. Although the 
COIN strategies initially adopted by the government were ineffective, its 
freedom of action was constrained by political considerations. Restructuring 
of the PC was necessary to enhance its effectiveness, but these very actions 
challenged the ruling Liberal Party’s grip on power. As a result, these 
changes were bitterly opposed and were only made when the United States 
linked aid to reform. As expected, the ‘loss’ of the constabulary cost the 
Liberal Party first its grip on Congress and later the presidency. A 
supporting power must be aware that its COIN prescriptions may not be 
welcomed by the local government and that it may prove necessary to exert 
significant pressure on an ally to compel reform. 
 
*** 
 
Although subordinating the police to the army when conducting COIN 
operations is contrary to the advice of most theorists, the Huk Rebellion 
illustrates that there are no cookie-cutter solutions to insurgency. The 
extraordinary step of putting the police and the army under a single 
command proved necessary to end the PC’s abusive treatment of the civilian 
population. Concrete grievances against the security forces and the landlords 
they served were driving popular support for the Huk insurgents in Luzon. 
Ending this mistreatment and having the security forces undertake civic 
action projects, which made a tangible  
 41 
improvement in the lot of many rural labourers, helped cultivate the 
impression that government forces were on the side of the people, not the 
powerful, which reduced the attractiveness of armed opposition. At the same 
time, the improvement in the population’s perception of the security forces 
enhanced their ability to cultivate intelligence on the insurgents. This proved 
to be a key turning point—the effectiveness of government forces was not a 
product of their firepower, but their ability to find the insurgents. In concert 
with the decentralization of operations and intelligence collection, this 
increased the effectiveness of forces in the field and allowed them to adapt to 
local circumstances. Unlike the earlier large-scale sweep operations which 
involved significant effort and disruption of the civilian population for little 
gain, small-unit tactics driven by quality intelligence allowed the security 
forces to put real pressure on the Huks. 
 
The combination of these factors resulted in a COIN campaign that not only 
proved to be militarily effective, but also convinced the population that the 
government was worthy of support, undercut most of the justification for 
armed violence, and provided real incentives for the insurgents to give up the 
fight. This latter point is demonstrated by the fact that the number of 
insurgents who surrendered to the government from 1947–53 (15,866) was 
larger than the numbers who were captured (4,269) and killed (9,695) 
combined. Although the PC were not leading the COIN effort at the end of 
the Hukbalahap Rebellion, their experience confirms the importance of 
reorganizing and retraining police forces to reduce corruption and abuse of 
the population in order to develop the intelligence necessary to detect and 
neutralize the insurgents and their supporters. 
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